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cross almost a decade, Desmond Tutu, Anglican cleric 
and chairman of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), supported a model of civil resistance 
against the apartheid regime based solely on religious 
argument. “Any person of faith has no real option,” he 
wrote. “In the face of injustice and oppression it is to 
disobey God not to stand up in opposition to that injustice and 
oppression. Any violation of the rights of God’s stand-in cries out 
to be condemned and to be redressed, and all people of good will 
must […] be engaged in […] preserving those rights as a religious 
duty.” (Tutu 1996, xi; also quoted in Appleby 2000, 13). 
Tutu’s struggle against apartheid in South Africa received wide 
popular support, as the high rate of civilian involvement in the 
work of the TRC confirmed. He played a key role in South Africa’s 
 
1 A first draft of this paper was presented at the workshop “Religious 
Intersections” held at Antwerp University in December 2017. I am grateful to 
Paul Weithman for accepting to participate to the workshop. For the stimulating 
discussion I am thankful to all the participants and, especially, to Domenico 
Melidoro, Willem Lemmens, Patrick Loobuyck, Thomas Schmidt, Aakash Singh 
Rathore and Walter Van Herk. Special thanks are owed to Corrado Fumagalli 
and Sebastiano Maffettone for their extensive comments and useful suggestions 
on the last version of this article. 
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transition to liberal democracy. Despite endorsing a 
“comprehensive” account of justice deeply rooted in his 
theological conviction, his role was never perceived as 
disrespectful or as an obstacle to the flourishing of South Africa’s 
new democratic regime. Yet, as Gutman and Thompson (2000, 
32–3) have warned, by appealing to religious doctrine, Tutu sought 
to overcome the moral conflict by imposing his own worldview 
while silencing other perspectives. 
Desmond Tutu is one of what Appleby (2000, 121ff) calls the 
“religious militants for peace.” Mahatma Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King Jr. are other examples of “militants” of this sort: 
people of faith who use religious arguments to buttress resistance 
against unjust regimes and to support vital political change with 
regard to rights and justice. Their forms of militancy are supported 
by what Appleby calls “nonviolent tolerance” (121). Yet the 
employment of religious arguments to justify political action seems 
to contradict the liberal democratic requirements of public reason, 
particularly the duty of liberal citizens to provide reasons that 
others could reasonably endorse. If “religious militants” violate 
their duty of civility by appealing to their comprehensive doctrines, 
should liberal democracy exclude this form of religiously founded 
dissent as being unreasonable? Or, rather, should liberal 
democracy embrace and support the efforts of “religious militants” 
to enhance and/or restore political justice? 
Ideas such as public reason and the duty of civility play a central 
role in Rawls’s Political Liberalism in outlining the appropriate 
constraints to public deliberation in matters of constitutional and 
basic justice. Rawls, however, famously adopts a more inclusive 
interpretation of public reason, embracing both antebellum 
abolitionist dissent and Martin Luther King’s forms of resistance. 
In these cases, Rawls emphasizes how, when deep divisions over 
citizens’ shared conception of justice emerge, religious and other 
Valentina Gentile – Rawls’s inclusivism and the case of “religious militants for peace” 
15 
 
moral reasons arising from the background culture may support a 
shared conception of political justice instead of undermining it 
(Rawls 1996, 251). 
Rawls’s treatment of religious dissent, especially that of King, is 
central to Weithman’s discussion regarding the application of the 
requirements of public reason to ordinary citizens in actual 
democracies (Weithman 2016, 120ff). For Weithman, citizens of 
liberal democracies have a “role-specific interest” (135) in receiving 
a justification that shows their commitment to citizens’ political 
and social equality and, therefore, their allegiance to the liberal 
democratic conception of justice. Thus, the exclusion of 
“comprehensive” – non-public – reasons from the political realm 
should be primarily understood as an attempt to preserve the 
stability of this construction. The violation of the “role-specific” 
duty of citizenship (140) might in fact threaten the forms of mutual 
trust and respect that apply to the liberal democratic cooperative 
enterprise. Yet, Weithman argues, an appeal to comprehensive 
doctrines does not always entail a threat to such forms of mutual 
trust and respect. Martin Luther King provides an example: 
although employing religious language, his struggle for civil rights 
was not perceived as a threat to the forms of mutual trust and 
respect that characterize a pluralistic liberal democracy, and this 
was so “because of the moral authority he had in American public 
life” (144). 
Building on Weithman’s intuition, one might argue that these 
forms of mutual trust and respect depend upon several factors, 
including the recognition by citizens of some shared cultural and 
historical conditions and, sometimes, of one’s moral authority. 
Thus, in certain circumstances, the appeal to comprehensive 
doctrines does not necessarily undermine the forms that the 
requirements of public reason are meant to protect, as it was in the 
case of King. 
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Several questions arise from Weithman’s account of inclusivism 
and his treatment of King’s case, however. How does liberal theory 
help to identify these particular circumstances? Do these 
circumstances depend on contextual – historical or cultural – 
conditions or on personal moral attributions? Both Rawls and 
Weithman are likely to recognize that these circumstances were 
present in the antebellum US or at the time of King. But they seem 
to disagree on what made these cases so special. Why, for example, 
were other black civil rights activists operating in the same context 
as King not afforded the same “moral authority” that he was? One 
could argue that there was something intrinsically “just” not only 
in King’s arguments but also in his articulation of them; this is 
perhaps what Rawls has in mind when he maintains that King’s 
arguments supported the conclusion of public reason (1996, 
250n.39). Weithman and Rawls disagree on whether there was a 
violation of the requirements of public reason in King’s case: Rawls 
holds that there was no violation, whereas for Weithman there was, 
but it did not undermine the sense of trust and respect that must 
pertain for liberal citizens to recognize one another. These 
contrasting views, to my mind, follow from two different views of 
inclusive public reason.  
In what follows, I consider the case of “religious militants,” and 
especially the example of Martin Luther King Jr, in the light of 
Rawls’s inclusive doctrine of public reason. I critically examine 
Weithman’s reading of Rawls’s “restrictive inclusivism” and 
explore some issues with this interpretation. Thereby I suggest an 
alternative interpretation of inclusivism and Rawls’s proviso in 
societies that are not well-ordered. Section 1 provides a summary 
of Weithman’s reconstruction of Rawls’s political turn and, 
especially, the principle of liberal legitimacy. Section 2 focuses on 
Weithman’s interpretation of stability for the right reasons and the 
problem of assurance related to it. For Weithman, an interpretation 
of “restrictive inclusivism” best captures Rawls’s requirements of 
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public reason in existing societies. Section 3 presents an alternative 
reading of Rawls’s inclusivism which takes seriously the case of 
“religious militants.” Section 4 discusses how such an inclusive 
view of public justification applies to forms of religiously based 
political dissent. I find that, in very non-ideal circumstances, there 
is no violation of the requirements of public reason if the form of 
religiously rooted dissent is buttressed by two factors: the first 
empirical and highly contextual, namely wide acceptance; and the 
second normative and morally constructed, namely the 
reasonableness of its premises. 
 
I 
Weithman on Rawls’s liberal legitimacy and the role of 
citizens of faith 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism provides perhaps the most 
sophisticated contemporary theory of liberal citizenship. Rawls 
recognizes that citizens inevitably hold a plurality of religious and 
secular views. But, he argues, it is possible for these citizens to 
achieve a consensus on a shared conception of political authority 
that is independent of these comprehensive doctrines. When this 
happens, the political conception is supported by an “overlapping 
consensus” that is stable for the “right reasons” (Rawls 1996, 
xxxix). He also argues that this shared conception should guide 
citizens’ public deliberation. The requirements of public reason ask 
citizens and legislators, when deliberating about constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice, to articulate their reasoning 
by appealing to “a conception that expresses political values that 
others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected 
reasonably to endorse” (xlviii). Rawls insists that citizens must 
honour the “duty of civility,” which is a moral duty to provide 
reasons that others can reasonably endorse (217). Non-public 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberal Legitimacy, Public Reason and Citizens of Faith 
18 
 
reasons, those that belong to the realm of the moral and religious 
doctrines that Rawls calls “comprehensive views,” can be 
introduced in public deliberation processes as long as supporting 
reasons that reflect citizens’ shared conception of political 
authority are provided “in due course” (l). 
This account of liberal citizenship has often been considered as 
incompatible with or even antagonistic to religion. Rawls’s view, 
and especially the central ideas of overlapping consensus and 
public reason, have been read as an attempt to keep religious 
doctrines separate from the public political sphere. This theory has 
been said to displace the disagreement from the realm of justice, 
the right, to that of comprehensive doctrines, the good. Yet 
reasonable citizens disagree about principles of justice just as much 
as they do about conceptions of the good life.2 Furthermore, the 
appeal to moral values coming from citizens’ comprehensive views 
might be crucial for enhancing the political conception of justice.3 
For many critics, political liberalism is an unfeasible theory since it 
asks citizens to set aside their private moralities in public decision-
making processes – sometimes an impossible ask: for instance, 
with regard to difficult decisions about the moral permissibility of 
abortion, “the case for seeking a political solution that brackets the 
contending moral and religious issues – that is neutral with respect 
to them – would seem especially strong” (Sandel 1995, 1778). Yet, 
for the critics, such a separation is also normatively problematic: it 
cannot adequately respond to the need for reform emerging in 
contemporary societies. When societies are characterized by deep 
injustices, the requirement of public reason might blind people to 
those injustices (on this see also Griffin 1997, 118). Some critics 
 
2 Quong (2005) has labelled this kind of criticism as the “asymmetry objection.” 
On this objection see Brower 1994, Caney 1995, Gaus 1999, Chan 2000. 
3 On this objection see Waldron 1993. This criticism has been discussed by 
Solum (1996) who calls it the “novelty objection.” 
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claimed that it was religious insight that guided the abolitionists 
and the civil rights movement in the US, for instance, so Rawls’s 
requirement of the silencing religious doctrines in public reason 
cannot adequately take these cases into consideration. 
Weithman’s Rawls, Political Liberalism and Reasonable Faith 
provides a fresh and illuminating contribution to a deeper 
understanding of Rawls’s sophisticated framework. Weithman 
reveals the rich and often neglected aspects of Political Liberalism 
that speak to how religions and citizens of faith may be 
accommodated in the political realm. Weithman’s interpretative 
project focuses on the centrality of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy and the related idea of stability for the “right reasons.” 
In contrast with the standard reading that rests upon a 
discontinuity between the idea of justice and that of legitimacy 
(Weithman 2016, 85ff), Weithman argues that Rawls’s new 
principle of liberal legitimacy is the most appropriate way to realize 
political justice under conditions of reasonable pluralism emerging 
in contemporary democracies. Thus, while refusing the standard 
criticism that Rawls would subscribe to an idea of intrinsic incivility 
of religions, Weithman shows that Rawls’s qualified exclusion of 
religions, what he calls “restrictive inclusivism” (151ff), is in fact 
motivated by Rawls’s concerns regarding the possibility that the 
appeal to non-public – religious – reasons could undermine the 
privileged form of stability required for liberal legitimacy. 
The reason behind Rawls’s political turn, Weithman argues 
(2016, 98ff), is his recognition that the idea of stability presented 
in A Theory of Justice was unrealistic (Rawls 1971, 395ff). That book 
laid out how a liberal society would encourage members’ views of 
the good to converge – that there would be a “congruence” 
between the right and the good (Rawls 1971, 513–14) – which 
would guarantee the achievement of an “inherent stability” of the 
scheme of social cooperation envisaged by justice as fairness 
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(Weithman 2016, 156ff; on this see also Weithman 2011, 327–35). 
But Rawls came to realize not only that this conclusion was 
improbable but also that it conflicted with the fact that liberal 
institutions encourage pluralism about the good. Now, the 
principle of liberal legitimacy, which is expressed in the idea of 
public reason, is a guarantee of a new idea of stability. Weithman 
believes that the conclusion of the new form of stability is 
supported by what he calls the “Ideal of Democratic Governance” 
(Weithman 2016, 100), which is the “ideal of citizens governing 
themselves in ways that each thinks the others might reasonably be 
expected to accept” (Rawls 1996, 218). The appeal to a shared 
framework of reasons is not aimed at silencing moral disagreement; 
rather, it encourages reasonable pluralism by showing a certain 
degree of compatibility between a private and public morality. The 
compatibility between the good and the right, however, suggests that 
state laws or decisions should not necessarily have to be regarded 
as good from the perspective of one citizen’s comprehensive 
doctrine to be seen as legitimate from the point of view of political 
justice.  
Weithman confronts his reading of Rawls’s new stability with 
some difficult cases and shows how the compatibility problem is 
solved in this framework. He considers the case of Jan, a citizen of 
faith who objects to abortion (2016, 102ff). This case, he argues, 
poses a serious problem for stability as Jan might believe that by 
allowing abortion, a well-ordered society be enacting a serious 
injustice and would fail to realize certain important goods in 
political life. Very roughly, the argument is that Rawls’s liberal 
legitimacy helps to distinguish an idea of justice of intended 
“political outcomes” from a more procedural understanding of 
political justice which reflects the ideal of Democratic Governance (103-
4). But if citizens of faith recognize that the law they oppose, say 
the law on abortion, is based on reasons of the right kind – that is, 
it reflects such an ideal – they might still see compatibility between 
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what they regard as true according to their moralities (that abortion 
is unjust) and the legitimacy of the exercise of power that has 
enacted that law (109). Thus, Weithman argues, the inclusion of 
citizens of faith within the broader liberal framework is possible if 
they recognize the burdens of judgement, develop a sense of 
legitimacy, distinguish a legitimate from a just exercise of political 
power, distinguish accepting the constitution from “accepting as 
legitimate (when not just) particular statutes or decisions,” and give 
enough weight to the Ideal of Democratic Governance (112).  
 
II 
Assurance, stability and the case of “militants for peace” 
With this scheme in mind, Weithman analyses Rawls’s public 
reason and the ideal of citizenship related to it (2016, part III, esp. 
chapters 6 and 7). Weithman introduces significant elements aimed 
at reconstructing Rawls’s inclusivism – including much that is 
insightful in considering the case of militants for peace and their 
role in actual liberal democratic societies.  
Rawls’s distinctive idea of stability, Weithman (155) reminds us, 
is not an institutional one; rather, it is primarily aimed at preserving 
a fair scheme of social cooperation that characterizes a well-
ordered liberal democratic society. Thus, the stability for the “right 
reasons” presented in Political Liberalism is constructed in order to 
solve a fundamental problem of assurance – a generalised 
prisoner’s dilemma, when citizens come to doubt other citizens’ 
allegiance to the political conception of justice – which puts at risk 
citizens’ effective compliance with the political conception. For 
Weithman, Rawls’s “inclusive view” and “wide view” are meant to 
preserve the stability of the fair terms of cooperation in an ideally 
just society (158). Rawls’s appeal to sincerity in public justification 
as well as the requirement of the “proviso,” which asks citizens to 
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justify “their conclusions in due course by public reasons” (Rawls 
1996, l), are both directed to solve such an assurance problem 
(Weithman 2016, 161). Weithman terms this “restrictive 
inclusivism,” meaning that it introduces “the weakest and least 
restrictive guidelines of public reason sufficient to solve the 
assurance problem” (163).  
Thus, while asserting that the standard criticism of Rawls’s 
exclusion of religions fails adequately to grasp Rawls’s overall 
project, Weithman also maintains that Rawls’s doctrine of public 
reason is only weakly inclusive, as long as this privileged form of 
stability is preserved. Rawls argues that the requirements of public 
reason “vary depending on historical and political conditions” 
(Rawls 1996, 251). Thus, one problem is to understand how his 
doctrine works in cases of actual existing societies and, especially, 
in those that are not well-ordered in a Rawlsian sense. Rawls 
famously presents three different cases that range from an ideally 
just to a non-ideal society (248ff). The differences between them 
seem to be reflected in these societies’ degree of inclusivism of 
religious and non-public reasons. Whereas in an ideally just society 
citizens should adopt an exclusive doctrine of public reason (248), 
a different situation emerges in nearly well-ordered societies and 
not well-ordered societies. In the case of nearly well-ordered 
societies, the requirements of public reason ask citizens whose 
arguments raise reservations about their allegiance to the 
constitutional order to show how their views are consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of the constitutional essentials (248–9). 
This case is well expressed by Weithman’s example of the US 
today, which he takes as a constitutional consensus: here, the 
importance of ensuring that the constitution is not undermined 
gives support to this interpretation of Rawls’s proviso (Weithman 
2016, 164). In the case of not well-ordered societies, where 
profound divisions emerge about the constitutional essentials 
(Rawls 1996, 249), however, Rawls seems to favour a more 
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inclusive doctrine of public reason. This is where my interpretation 
of Rawls’s inclusivism differs from Weithman’s.  
Sometimes, and particularly under unfavourable conditions, the 
employment of arguments that reflect citizens’ comprehensive 
views might be consistent with the conclusion of public reason and 
reinforce citizens’ allegiance to the constitutional order (Rawls 
1996, 250). Martin Luther King Jr provides an example of this, 
though Weithman deviates from Rawls in his understanding of the 
case. For Weithman, Rawls’s argument for King’s reasonableness 
is founded on the belief that King would have defended his 
political views by appealing to a conception of justice independent 
of comprehensive doctrines (Weithman 2016, 142). In other 
words, to explain why citizens had no doubt about King’s 
allegiance to the constitutional essentials, Rawls seeks to show that 
King’s political dissent met the proviso. In fact, Weithman argues, 
not only did King not appeal to public reasons, he was in fact 
strongly motivated by his religious convictions. Thus, for 
Weithman, Rawls’s “restrictive inclusivism” is unpersuasive 
precisely because it fails to acknowledge why King was so 
successful in convincing people that his cause was just even though 
he used religious arguments (143).  
Weithman provides a different explanation for King’s case. He 
believes that the requirements of public reason should be 
understood in terms of “role-specific duties of citizenship” rather 
than as a moral obligation (122). The problem, then, is to 
understand how these duties are specified by the liberal conception 
of citizenship. Whereas Rawls insists on an ideal of citizenship that 
imposes “a moral, not a legal, duty of civility” (Rawls 1996, 217) to 
provide public justification, for Weithman this account fails in 
generating appropriate requirements of public reason for ordinary 
citizens. These requirements are in fact determined by the role of 
citizenship. Thus, Weithman opposes a morality of roles to the 
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morality of ideals that Rawls seems to endorse in some sections of 
his work (Weithman 2016, 132-3). Ordinary citizens of actual 
liberal democracies have a “role-specific interest” (135) in receiving 
a justification that shows their commitment to citizens’ political 
and social equality and this, in turns, generates an appropriate role-
specific duty of civility. Thus, the liberal qualified exclusion of 
“comprehensive” – non-public – reasons should be primarily 
understood as a violation of such a “role-specific” duty (140). This 
violation is understood as threatening the forms of mutual trust 
and respect that apply to actual pluralistic liberal democracies.  
Yet, Weithman argues, the appeal to comprehensive views does 
not always endanger such forms of mutual trust and respect. This 
was for instance what happened in the case of King. For 
Weithman, citizens do not always look to one another’s religious 
political discourse for the basis of their agreement, but they 
sometimes do, and the justification cannot be found in their way 
of reasoning (143-4). In the case of King, citizens clearly 
recognized his moral authority and endorsed his religious political 
struggle. For Weithman, King’s moral authority doesn’t depend on 
what he said in public forums. Rather, it was related to the special 
circumstances of his life and political struggle. King’s authority 
depended upon contingent features, and particularly his 
membership of a “racial group that suffered great oppression and 
injustice” (144). 
 
III 
Rawls’s inclusive doctrine: a restatement 
Weithman’s treatment of King is certainly sophisticated and 
helps us to understand the political and historical relevance of his 
struggle. However, if what counts is King’s life and that he was 
perceived as a member of a group that suffered great oppression, 
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it is not clear why other activists for black civil rights, such as 
Malcom X, did not garner the same popular support. To provide 
an adequate answer to this question, it is necessary to reconsider 
the requirements of public reason and Rawls’s doctrine of 
inclusivism in the case of not-well-ordered societies. In my view, 
Rawls here brings to a higher level the context-dependency of the 
doctrine of public reason. As mentioned above, Rawls argues that 
“the appropriate limits of public reason vary depending on 
historical and social conditions” (1996, 251). Thus, it is reasonable 
to think that in the case of King or the abolitionists Rawls’s proviso 
should lead to another interpretation of these requirements. King’s 
struggle did not in fact violate the ideal of public reason because 
he never signalled that his comprehensive doctrine was the only 
source for justifying his political struggle. Referring to both the 
abolitionists and King, Rawls argues that, “given those historical 
conditions, it was not unreasonable of them to act as they did for 
the sake of the ideal of public reason itself” (251). 
Rawls seems to suggest that there was something intrinsic to the 
way King or the abolitionists articulated their struggle which is 
absent in other cases. They were people of faith who not only 
pursued a peaceful form of dissent – a form of “non-violent 
tolerance,” in Appleby’s words (2000, 121) – but also articulated 
their religious political arguments consistently with a political ideal 
of citizens understood as free and equal. Thus, the difference 
between King’s civil dissent and that of other activists is that 
King’s appeal to religious argument did not undermine his tolerant 
disposition towards other ways of justifying those political values. 
For Rawls, King’s religious doctrines “fully support constitutional 
values and accord with public reason” (1996, 250n.39).  
Such an interpretation of the inclusive doctrine of public reason 
is also compatible with Richards’s distinction between the negative 
and affirmative role of public reason (Richards 1994, 834ff). In his 
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work on public reason and abolitionism, Richards argues that, in 
the negative sense, the requirements of public reason are meant to 
reject the public authority of essentially sectarian arguments that 
are rooted in an entrenched political epistemology, which often 
threatens fundamental rights. Conversely, in the affirmative sense, 
these limits “make available normatively empowering” the political 
struggles of traditionally silenced people (Richards 1994, 834). 
These struggles might and, in general, do both reasonably resist 
unjust regimes (for example, the South African apartheid regime) 
and political practices that have silenced peoples (for example, 
slavery), and make positive claims, sometimes based on 
comprehensive views, both to respect those peoples’ rights and to 
take concern for their interests in the definition of the political 
conception of justice. For Richards, the affirmative role of public 
reason is particularly important to understand the case of King. His 
elaboration of anti-racist principles was not only made against a 
political and secular racist orthodoxy, but more generally was 
aimed at countering a dominant, even religious, racist doctrine 
(838). Especially in the “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King’s 
arguments were primarily directed at the dominant religious elite 
that failed to take seriously the evil of segregation and the role of 
public non-violent resistance to it. Even when articulating his civil 
dissent in his own words, King therefore never expressed his views 
in ways that could have undermined his commitment to an ideal of 
citizens understood as free and equal. 
Let us now return to Weithman’s interpretative project. If I 
understand it correctly, it seems that although his view of 
“restrictive inclusivism” fits well the cases of well-ordered and 
nearly well-ordered societies, adapting this framework to non-ideal 
circumstances – such those of the antebellum abolitionists and 
King’s struggle for civil rights – is more difficult. As Weithman 
himself recognizes, citizens’ allegiance to the political conception 
of justice in these circumstances is not secured by an overlapping 
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consensus nor by a constitutional consensus, and the conception 
of justice is not sufficient to protect citizens’ political autonomy. 
In these contexts, then, the best interpretation of the proviso is 
significantly less restrictive than that suggested by Weithman in the 
case of nearly well-ordered societies. In societies where the 
compatibility between the good within the comprehensive doctrines 
and the right of the political conception is highly contested, the 
proviso seems to work as an affirmative feature. Thus, the appeal 
to the inclusive doctrine of public reason might help to forge 
agreement on what is right within the comprehensive doctrines.  
In concluding his account of the limits of public reason Rawls 
clarifies that “appropriate limits of public reason vary depending 
on historical and social conditions […] the main point is that 
citizens are to be moved to honour the ideal itself, in the present 
when circumstances permit, but often we may be forced to take a 
longer view. Under different conditions with different current 
doctrines and practices, the ideal may be best achieved in different 
ways […] in less good times by what may appear to be the inclusive 
view” (1996, 251). Considering the special circumstances in which 
Martin Luther King Jr expressed his dissent, it is difficult to deny 
that he did it by honouring this ideal. 
 
IV 
A weak interpretation of public justification and the 
problem of sincerity 
In not well-ordered societies, the inclusive doctrine of public 
reason is concerned with the definition of a conception of political 
justice of intended outcomes, such as the abolishment of slavery, 
rather than with strong procedural requirements. Yet it is still 
possible to frame forms of civil dissent within certain procedural 
constraints. Rawls argues that the abolitionists and King alike were 
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reasonable because “they did not provided they thought, or on 
reflection they would have thought (as they certainly could have 
thought), that the comprehensive reasons they appealed to were 
required to give sufficient strength to the political conception to 
be subsequently realized” (1996, 251). Thus, the inclusive doctrine 
introduces what we might call a weaker version of the requirements 
of public reason, which better reflects the non-ideal circumstances 
emerging in not well-ordered societies.  
Boettcher has distinguished a strong public justification, which 
introduces a very high justificatory standard, from what he calls a 
“weak public justification.” Whereas the former represents “an 
aspirational ideal” (2015, 198), the latter is more appropriate to less 
idealised situations. In the weak interpretation of public 
justification: “a decision D about the law L is weakly justified in P 
if and only if D is generated by reasonably acceptable and widely 
accepted decision-making procedures, and D’s success is not 
essentially dependent on the votes or other activity of 
unreasonable members of P, and each reasonable member of P 
honours requirements of public reason – or would be prepared to 
honour these requirements if called upon to vote or decide – in 
making his or her deliberative contribution to D” (198). Here 
Boettcher makes an interesting distinction between reasonable 
acceptance and wide acceptance. A “reasonably acceptable 
procedure,” he argues, “is one that is fully consistent with a 
reasonable political conception of justice and facilitates ongoing 
democratic deliberation about matters of law and policy. 
Reasonable acceptability is thus primarily a normative notion. By 
contrast, wide acceptance is in principle empirically verifiable and 
sustained by ongoing successful practices and historical 
experience” (199). 
Returning to the case discussed in this paper, such an account 
suggests a different explanation for King’s successful struggle. His 
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success depended on the fact that he did not violate the 
requirements of public reason, at least not those generated by the 
inclusive doctrine. These forms of political dissent in fact met two 
conditions of the weak interpretation of public justification: the 
first eminently empirical, that is the wide acceptance of the values 
expressed in that view; and the second explicitly normative, that is 
the independence of that form of dissent from clearly 
unreasonable premises. Wide acceptance does not directly imply 
shareability. King did not necessarily need to articulate his 
arguments in public terms, as in fact he did not. However, the 
actual and wide acceptance of the values expressed in his view 
made those values available to all citizens. 
To this interpretation of inclusivism Weithman could raise an 
important objection regarding the sincerity of public reason. Rawls 
recognizes that sincerity plays an important role in ensuring to one 
another our allegiance to the political conception of justice (1996, 
248). This concern undoubtedly plays an important role in 
interpreting the proviso in the case of nearly well-ordered societies. 
Weithman could therefore argue that, even accepting that King did 
honour an ideal of public reason, the ideal itself was not in fact 
what motivated his political struggle. It is true that King’s religious 
motivation was important in shaping the political values he 
defended in the public forum. Thus, by violating public sincerity, 
was King in fact violating the requirements of public reason? 
Schwartzman has interestingly suggested that it would be 
misleading to believe that public reason has to be self-motivating 
(2011, 390). He recognizes that, under certain non-ideal 
conditions, citizens and public officials may have reasons to violate 
a principle of public sincerity, but that this should not be seen as a 
violation of the requirements of public reason (2011, 393n.52). 
According to this interpretation, what counts is that citizens are 
able to provide public reasons that they sincerely believe are 
sufficient but which are not necessarily their final or ultimate 
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source of motivation. Thus, returning to the case of King, as far as 
his arguments were widely accepted and its premises were not 
clearly unreasonable, it is unimportant to unpick how he related his 
political values to his comprehensive doctrine. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In response to Weithman’s notion of “restrictive inclusivism” 
this paper suggests an alternative reading of the requirements of 
public reason. This is based on a weak interpretation of public 
justification which rests on two features: wide acceptance and 
independence from unreasonable premises. Such an account helps 
not only to understand several cases of “militants for peace” but 
also to distinguish between these and other, unreasonable, forms 
of dissent. Furthermore, it suggests a more general objection to 
Weithman’s interpretation of the requirements of public reason: in 
the special case of not well-ordered societies, the distinction 
between procedural justice and justice of outcomes becomes 
highly contestable. In these contexts, a strong interpretation of the 
proviso is inadequate and should be weakened in favour of a 
different interpretation of inclusivism. In non-ideal circumstances, 
the inclusive doctrine of public reason should be better understood 
in its affirmative role. It relies on the conjunction of two aims: 
attaining a better view of political justice while recognizing a 
procedure that is widely accepted and does not depend on clearly 
unreasonable premises. Religious doctrines undoubtedly grounded 
King’s struggle for civil rights but this does not undermine the 
reasonableness of his form of dissent, as far as the values expressed 
in his view supported constitutional principles and were consistent 
with the ideal of public reason (Rawls 1996, 250n.39).  
This paper suggests a different explanation for King’s political 
and moral authority. In contrast to Weithman, I believe that it 
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derives from what he said in public forums. First, his arguments, 
albeit religious in nature, were not seen to rely on clearly 
unreasonable premises. Second, the general values expressed in his 
view were in effect widely accepted by reasonable citizens; this is 
so because reasonable citizens could see the compatibility of 
King’s arguments with a view of political justice expressed in the 
constitutional essentials. For these reasons, King was never 
perceived as undermining the political ideal of citizens as free and 
equal. This is obviously not the case with regard to other leaders, 
such Malcom X. He was a religious activist who employed his 
comprehensive views to support his form of political dissent. Yet 
his radical crusade against white supremacism was unreasonable: it 
was based on unreasonable premises, including the use of violence 
as an acceptable means of protest, and the general values he 
expressed did not meet the requirement of wide acceptance. By 
supporting an alleged superiority of black people, he was in effect 
endorsing a form of political dissent that was in clear contrast to 
constitutional principles and, therefore, the ideal of public reason. 
 
LUISS University and University of Antwerp 
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